Discussion
Topic 4: If the Piper Alpha disaster occurred today, discuss the current safety
legislative regime that will apply.
Comment 1: node/13334#comment-22827
Discussion
Topic 8: subsea integrity and reliability management
Comment 2: node/13348#comment-20766
Discussion
Topic 9: Safety and risk management in oil and gas industry
Comment 3: node/13349#comment-20165
Comment 4: node/13349#comment-20168
Comment 5: node/13349#comment-20208
Comment 6: node/13349#comment-20451
Comment 7: node/13349#comment-20452
Comment 8: node/13349#comment-20708
Topic 13:
Safety, Reliability and Integrity Mangement Processes and the Human Factor
effect
Comment 9: node/13301#comment-20209
Comment 10: node/13301#comment-20450
Topic 17:
Should Arctic drilling activities be halted until the Safety and Technology are
improved?
Comment 11: node/13408#comment-20749
Topic 28: Your
view on iMechanica Safety Engineering and Risk Management Debate
Comment 12: node/13475#comment-20709
Topic 55: Can
the applications of Ergonomics Improve Work Place Health and Safety?
Comment 13: node/13785#comment-22835
Blog Created: Topic 57: WHY DID MACONDO HAPPEN AND CHANGES
IT BROUGHT TO HEALTH AND SAFETY LAWS
Comment 14: node/13805
Comment 15: node/13805#comment-22788
Comment 16: node/13805#comment-22811
Comment 17: node/13805#comment-22812
Topic 48:
Safety issues during transportation and distribution of oil and gas.
Comment 18: node/13745#comment-22842
Comment 19: Topic 44: INHERENT SAFETY IN PROCESS SAFETY
MANAGEMENT – A PRACTICAL APPROACH
Topic 55: Can the
applications of Ergonomics Improve Work Place Health and Safety?
Comment 20: node/13785#comment-22850
The Macondo incident failed due to the failure of the BOP atop the Macondo well. The BOP was designed to activate and seal the well if control was lost, even in a “low probability, high impact event”, such as the blowout that occurred the evening of April 20, 2010. The report released from NAE/NRC, entitled “Macondo Well-Deepwater Horizon Blowout, lessons for improving offshore Drilling Safety”, summarized the known and suspected reasons for why the BOP failed:
There was only one Blind Shear Ram (BSR) on the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP. A casing Shear Ram (CSR) located below the BSR was able to shear thicker pip, but was not capable of sealing the well.
The BSR was not designed to shear pipe that was under compression rather than tension. The drill pipe on the Macondo well was under high compression, either from the weight of the pipe above, the pressure below, or both. Also, the hydraulic pressure inside the pipe effectively created further compression.
Compression buckled the drill pipe inside the BOP, moving it off centre, so that the BSR couldn’t completely shear it and could not seal the annulus.
The BSR was designed with one V-shaped blade and one straight blade, which tests have shown requires more hydraulic pressure to shear pipe. Also, the blades on the BSR were not wide enough to span the whole cross section of the annulus.
Attempts in the control room to initiate the ESD failed, because the multiplexing communication cables were severed in the explosion and fire.
Once communication and hydraulics were lost, the deadman system should have activated the BSR, but apparently it did not. The BSR operated by two control pods. Investigation revealed a low batter charge in one control pod and incorrectly wired solenoid valve in the other, which may have caused the failure.
Safety Systems, “Could we have prevented the Macondo Well blowout‟, World Oil. January 2012, p. 21-22.